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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case was a breach of employment contract case between RespondentiCross-
Appellant Terri M. Sanders (hereinafter referred to as "Sanders") and Appellant/Cross-
Respondent Board of Trustees of the Mountain Home School District No. 193 (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Board"). 1 R. Vol. J, pp. 4 - 12. Following trial, the Board petitioned for 
attorney fees and costs. R. Vol. J, p. 112. The honorable trial court granted costs, in part, but 
refused to award attorney fees. R. Vol. J, p. 137 144. Though the Board requested attorney fees 
pursuant to Ie. §§ 12-117, 12-120(3) and 12-1212, the Court determined that fees were only 
available to the Board under § 12-117. R. Vol. J, pp. 139 - 41. The Court also determined that 
fees were not appropriate under Ie. § 12-117 because the Court did not find "that the Plaintiff 
advocated a plainly fallacious position" and found that there was a legitimate issue for trial. R. 
Vol. J,p. 141-43. 
The attorney fee issue was a cause of confusion for the parties (and apparent confusion 
for the trial Court, see R. Vol. J, p. 140), as there appeared to be conflicting standards as to 
whether attorney fees for prevailing on a breach of employment contract claim may be sought 
pursuant to Ie. § 12-120(3), or are limited to Ie. § 12-117. There is clear and recently affirmed 
case law allowing an award of attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) where the claims in the case 
allege breach of employment contract. See Willie v. Ed. of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 
Original1y, there were six claims in the Complaint, including two for violation of the Open Meetings Act 
and for breach of contract related to the alleged violations of the Open Meeting Act. See R. Vol. I, pp. 8 9. 
However, these two claims were dismissed and abandoned prior to trial. See R. Vol. I, p. 24 - 25. The remaining 
four breach of contract claims were tried before a jury. 
2 The Board abandoned the request for fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-121 before the Court issued a ruling on the 
subject. See R. Vol. I, p. 133. 
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302, 307 (2002) (holding that a Board of Trustees of a school district was entitled to attorney 
fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) when it prevailed on a breach of employment contract claim brought 
by an employee); Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 942, 265 P.3d 1144, 1154 (2011) 
(upholding Willie and ruling that attorney fees were appropriate under Ie. § 12-120(3) for Idaho 
State University when it prevailed on a breach of employment contract claim). Instead of relying 
on these cases, the trial Court ruled that attorney fees were only available to the Board under Ie. 
§ 12-117, citing to Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 226 
P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010), reh'g denied (Mar. 17,2010), which states that 12-117 is the exclusive 
source of attorney fees to the entities to which it applies. R. Vol. I, pp. 140 - 41. 
The Board now appeals and requests that the Court determine whether an award of 
attorney fees for a Board of Trustees of a School District is appropriate under Ie. § 12-120(3), 
where the claims brought by Sanders were clearly related to a breach of her employment 
contract. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
In the Complaint, Sanders alleged two breaches of her employment due to violations of 
the then applicable Master Contract (specifically sections 2.7 and 2.11 of the Master Contract). 
R. Vol. I, pp. 10- 11 (Complaint, pp. 7 - 8). Sanders also alleged two additional breaches of her 
employment contract related to violations of Idaho Code § 33-1201 and IDAPA § 
08.02.03.109.02(e)3, R. Vol. I, pp. 9 - 10 (Complaint pp. 6 -7), under the theory that if a school 
district violates a statute or administrative rule, the affected teacher's employment contract has 
In the Complaint, this was listed as violation oflDAPA 8.02.03.190.02(0. R. Vol. 1, p. 9. However, during 
depositions and throughout discovery, it was clarified that the allegedly violated IDAP A section was really 
08.02.03.109.02(e). This was the IDAPA section that was discussed and litigated at trial. 
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also been violated.4 See, e.g. Zattiero v. Homedale School District No. 370, 137 Idaho 568, 571 
(2002) ("extant law is written into and made part of every written contract"); Robinson v. Joint 
Sch. Dist., 100 Idaho 263, 265 (1979) (same, discussing applicability to teacher employment 
contracts); Fidelity Trust Co. v. State, 72 Idaho 137, 149 (1951) (same).5 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on these issues. R. Vol. I, p. 21. 
The motions for summary judgment were denied, and these four claims for alleged breaches of 
contract were tried before a jury. R. Vol. I, p. 34. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
Board, determining that no breach of contract had occurred. R. Vol. I, p. 56. 
C. Procedural History 
Sanders filed a Complaint with the District Court for Elmore County on March 9, 2009, 
alleging five breach of contract claims and one claim for statutory violation. R. Vol. I, p. 4 - 12. 
At summary judgment, the statutory violation and one of the breach of contract claims were 
dismissed or abandoned. R. Vol. I, pp. 24 - 25. Trial was had on Sanders's four remaining breach 
of contract claims on January 17,2012, through January 19,2012. R. Vol. I (Register of Actions, 
p. 6 of7). On January 19,2012, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Board. R. Vol. I, p. 56. 
On February 3,2012, the Board filed its Motion for Attorney's Fees and Memorandum of 
Costs, along with supporting affidavits and documentation. R. Vol. I, pp. 58 - 114. The Board 
requested costs as a matter of right in the amount of $944.95, discretionary costs in the amount 
of $3,917.50, and attorney fees in the amount of $51,483.50, pursuant to both IC § 12-117 and 
12-120(3). R. Vol. I, pp. 112 -13. 
4 R. Vo!. J, pp. 9 10,26 27. 
The Board argued at summary judgment that this rule should not apply to these statutes and rules, because 
they did not provide any direct benefit to Sanders. R. Vol. J, pp. 26 - 27. However, that issue is not now on appeal, 
and so will not be addressed in this brief. 
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On February 21, 2012, Sanders filed a Motion to Disallow Defendant's Memorandum of 
Costs. R. Vol. I, p. 115. Sanders's Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Disallow was filed 
February 27, 2012. R. Vol. I, p. 117. Sanders did not object to the costs as a matter of right. R. 
Vol. I, p. 117. Sanders objected to an award of discretionary costs and attorney fees, but only on 
the basis that such should not be awarded based on legal grounds. R. Vol. I, pp. 118 - 23. 
Sanders never made any objection as to the amount of or reasonableness of the discretionary 
costs or attorney fees requested. R. Vol. I, pp. 118 - 23, 135, 139. 
On March 8, 2012, the Board filed a Reply in Support of the Motion for Attorney's Fees 
and Memorandum of Costs. R. Vol. I, p. 125. 
The Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part Defendant's 
Motion for Costs and Denying Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees on March 27, 2012, the 
same date that Judgment was issued in this matter.6 R. Vol. I, p. 137. The Court awarded costs as 
a matter of right in the amount of $944.95, and discretionary costs in the amount of $2,304.50. R. 
Vol. I, p. 143. Attorney fees were denied under I.e. § 12-120(3) on the grounds that the Court 
determined such was not the applicable statute for awarding attorney fees. R. Vol. I, pp. 139 - 41. 
Attorney fees were denied under I. e. § 12-117 on the ground that the Court determined the case 
to be non-frivolous. R. Vol. I, pp. 141 - 43. 
On April 27, 2012, the Board filed a Notice of Appeal with regard to whether attorney 
fees were allowable to the Board under I.e. § 12-120(3). On May 15, 2012, Sanders filed a 
Notice of Cross Appeal with regard to the award of discretionary costs. 
6 No hearing was ever held on the Board's request for attorney fees and costs. R. Vo!. J, p. 137. Though 
several attempts were made to schedule (and reschedule) a hearing before Judge Norton, due to difficulties 
contacting the Court to find an available date for hearing the issue, the Judge issued a ruling before a satisfactory 
date for all parties and the Court could be found. Therefore, no Notice of Hearing was filed. 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Applicability of Ie. § 12-120(3) to breach of employment contract claims brought 
against School District employers: Is the Board of Trustees of Mountain Home 
School District entitled to attorney fees under I C. § 12-120(3) where it prevailed on 
all breach of employment contract claims brought by Plaintiff Terri Sanders? 
2. Exclusivity of I e. § 12-117 to School District employers for breach of employment 
contract claims: Is Ie. § 12-117 the exclusive source under which the Board of 
Trustees of Mountain Home School District may seek attorney fees when prevailing 
on breach of employment contract claims? 
3. Attorney Fees on Appeal: The Board seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant 
to Ie. §§ 12-117 and 12-120(3), as allowed by IA.R. 40(a), 41(a), and 35(a). 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court reviews an award or denial of attorney fees by the District Court for 
an abuse of discretion. See City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353, 355 (2012) 
(holding that review of a decision to deny attorney fees under Ie. § 12-117 is done under an 
abuse of discretion standard); Tavlor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 848, 243 P.3d 642, 664 
(2010) (review of an award of attorney fees under Ie. § 12-121 is done under an abuse of 
discretion standard); BECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 296, 233 
P.3d 1216, 1218 (2010), reh'g denied (July 8, 2010) (abuse of discretion standard utilized in 
analyzing fee award under Ie. § 12-120(3)). 
To determine whether there is an abuse of discretion this Court considers whether 
(1) the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) the court reached its decision by an 
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exercise of reason. 
Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.e., 148 Idaho 638, 639-40, 227 P.3d 568, 569-70 
(2010). See also BECO Canst. Co., Inc., 149 Idaho at 296-97, 233 P.3d at 1218-19 (same). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The Board contends that Judge Norton's decision to deny attorney fees under Ie. § 12-
120(3) (and that Ie. § 12-117 is the exclusive award of attorney fees in this case) is an abuse of 
discretion. First, Judge Norton concluded that "I.e. § 12-120(3) is not appropriate authority to 
award attorney fees because attorney fees are exclusively controlled by § 12-117 in this public 
entity case." R. Vol. I, p. 141. The Board argues (discussed in more detail below), that Ie. § 12-
117 is only exclusive as to awards against "public entities", but not when a public entity prevails 
on a breach of contract case. Therefore, Judge Norton did not properly identify this issue as a 
matter of her discretion, in that she believed she was limited by law. Further, she did not act 
consistent with legal standards, as there are a number of cases awarding attorney fees to 
governmental subdivisions/state agencies when they prevail on breach of contract cases. By 
ignoring these cases, Judge Norton ignored relevant and applicable legal standards. Therefore, 
the Board requests that Judge Norton's decision denying attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) be 
reversed. 
Though there is some case law discussing the exclusivity of I e. § 12-117 under certain 
circumstances, no case prohibits an award of attorney fees to a governmental subdivision or state 
agency under Ie. § 12-120(3) when prevailing on claims that fall under that statute. First, there 
is nothing in either the language of Ie. § § 12-120(3) and 12-117 which requires one to apply 
over the other. Similarly, the timeline of cases discussing the exclusivity of Ie. § 12-117 does 
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not prohibit an award under Ie. § 12-120(3) when a governmental entity prevails on a breach of 
contract case. The cases discussing exclusivity, almost without exception, discuss other statutes 
besides 12-120(3), or circumstances that do not apply to this case. Finally, even if I e. § 12-117 
is exclusive, it does not limit the Board as a party (as opposed to a District) from obtaining 
attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3). These issues will be discussed in more detail below. 
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF IDAHO CODE §§ 12-120(3) AND 12-117 DO NOT 
PROHIBIT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 12-120(3) IN BREACH 
OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST A SCHOOL BOARD. 
The Board contended before Judge Norton, and continues to contend, that attorney fees 
are allowable under Ie. § 12-120(3) for the Board in prevailing on a breach of employment 
contract case. There is nothing in the language of either Ie. §§ 12-120(3) or 12-117 which 
makes one exclusive or preclusive of the other. 
In ruling that Ie. § 12-120(3) was not available as a source for attorney fees for the 
Board in this case, Judge Norton stated "It is apparent in the most recent case law that where 
sections 12-120(3) and 12-117 overlap, 12-117 is exclusive and preclusive." R. Vol. I, p. 141. 
Judge Norton went on to state that 
While the Willie court allowed an award of attorney fees on the teacher's breach 
of contract claim as a "commercial transaction" within the scope of I.C. § 12-
120(3), the parties in Willie did not raise the applicability of § 12-117 so the 
defendant's argument that restricting attorney fees in this case to the standards of 
§ 12-117 would require Willie to be overruled is not accurate. Mountain Home 
School District is squarely defined under 63-3101 Therefore, I.C. § 12-120(3) is 
not appropriate authority to award attorney fees because attorney fees are 
exclusively controlled by § 12-117 in this public entity case. 
R. Vol. I, p. 141. In utilizing this language, Judge Norton has essentially concluded that § 12-117 
is the exclusive source of attorney fees only if someone brings it up. Therefore, the reason why 
Ie. § 12-117 was not exclusive in Willie was because no one addressed it. This makes little 
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sense, as parties could avoid exclusivity problems merely by picking and choosing which 
attorney fee statutes to mention in their motions for attorney fees. This is not an appropriate 
method of determining applicability of fee statutes. 
When interpreting Ie. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-117, as the statutes generally deal with the 
same subject matter (an award of attorney fees), the Court should interpret both statutes 
harmoniously, avoiding contradiction if possible. "It is the duty of the courts in construing 
statutes to harmonize and reconcile laws wherever possible and to adopt that construction of 
statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory provisions." Sweitzer 
V. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27,31 (1990). 
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which we exercise free 
review. Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 133 Idaho 353, 358, 986 P.2d 1019, 
1024 (Ct.App.1999). When interpreting a statute, we will construe the statute as 
a whole to give effect to the legislative intent. George W Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990); Corder, 
133 Idaho at 358, 986 P.2d at 1024. The plain meaning of a statute will prevail 
unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless the plain meaning 
leads to absurd results. Messenger, 118 Idaho at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388; Corder, 
133 Idaho at 358, 986 P.2d at 1024. When statutes conflict, a later or more 
specific statute controls over an earlier or more general statute. Johnson v. 
Boundary Sch. Dist. No. 101, 138 Idaho 331, 335, 63 P.3d 457,461 (2003); Hyde 
v. Fisher, 143 Idaho 782, 786, 152 P.3d 653, 657 (Ct.App.2007). Separate 
statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously, 
if at all possible, so as to further the legislative intent. Cox v. Mueller, 125 Idaho 
734, 736, 874 P.2d 545, 547 (1994); State v. Resendiz-Fortanel, 131 Idaho 488, 
489,959 P.2d 845, 846 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 540, 861 
P.2d 107, 110 (Ct.App.1993). 
Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 658, 182 P.3d 713,715 (Ct. App. 2008). Applying 
these principles to this case, the Board contends that there is no conflict between Ie. § § 12-
120(3) and 12-117 which would lead to one being exclusive over the other. 
The language of Ie. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-117 do not conflict so as to prevent an award 
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of attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3). Ie. § 12-117 contains the following language: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, 
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other 
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
(5) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Person" means any individual, partnership, limited liability 
partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association or any 
other private organization; 
(b) "Political subdivision" means a city, a county, any taxing district or a 
health district; 
(c) "Proceeding" means any administrative proceeding, administrative 
judicial proceeding, civil judicial proceeding or petition for judicial review 
or any appeal from any administrative proceeding, administrative judicial 
proceeding, civil judicial proceeding or petition for judicial review. 
(d) "State agency" means any agency as defined in section 67-5201, Idaho 
Code. 
Ie.. § 12-117 (emphasis added). There is nothing in the language of this statute making it the 
exclusive source of attorney fees to governmental entities. Quite the contrary, the language 
utilizes the phrase "unless otherwise provided by statute", which indicates that other statutes may 
apply instead of I C. § 12-117.7 Interpreting this language so that it is deemed to be "exclusive" 
as to any other attorney fee statute is not in line with the requirement that "The plain meaning of 
a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless the plain 
meaning leads to absurd results." Beehler, 145 Idaho at 658, 182 P.3d at 715. Reading 
exclusivity into the statute essentially adds language and/or meaning into the statute that does not 
exist, nor does it appear to be intended by the plain language. 
7 The phrase "unless otherwise provided by statute" is not a recent addition. It was added to the statute in 
2000. 2000 Idaho Laws Chp. 241, § 1 (2000 S.B. l333). 
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Similarly, the language of Ie. § 12-120(3) applies to the situation that arose in this case. 
It states: 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to 
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state ofIdaho or political subdivision thereof 
Ie. § 12-120(3) (emphasis added). Employment contracts have been held to be "commercial 
transactions", and therefore this section applies to all of Sanders's claims (each of which is 
labeled "breach of contract"s). See Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 942, 265 P.3d 
1144, 1154 (2011) ("Actions brought for breach of an employment contract are considered 
commercial transactions and are subject to the attorney fee provision of I.C. § 12-120(3)."); 
Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002) (same); Treasure Valley 
Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 492, 20 P.3d 21,28 (Ct. App. 2001) 
("Actions on employment contracts are subject to the attorney fee provisions of § 12-120(3)."); 
Clark v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 532, 5 P.3d 988, 993 (2000) (attorney 
fees available to the State under 1 e. § 12-120 for employment contract claims, citing to Atwood 
v. Western Construction, Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 923 P.2d 479 (Ct.App.l996». Further, as all of 
Sanders's claims were breach of contract claims, the Board attorney fees available under this 
statute would be the fees for defending the entire case. See Sadid, 151 Idaho at 942, 265 P.3d at 
1154 (discussing that attorney fees are allowed under 12-120(3) for the time spent defending 
R. Vol. I, pp. 9 -11. 
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against the breach of contract claims); BECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 
Idaho 719, 726,184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008) (Ie. 12-120(3) only supports an award of fees for 
defending contract claims). 
The language of Ie. § 12-120(3) in no way conflicts with Ie. § 12-117, but instead 
complements it. By its plain language, § 12-120(3) is clearly meant to apply to the "state of 
Idaho or political subdivision thereof'. If I e. § 12-117 were held to be exclusive as to Ie. § 12-
120(3), the definition of "party" contained within Ie. § 12-120(3) would be rendered essentially 
superfluous, and be read out of the statute. This is not an appropriate interpretation. See Hillside 
Landscape Canst., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 749, 753, 264 P.3d 388, 392 (2011) 
(interpretations which read out portions of the statute are disfavored); State v. Yzaguirre, 144 
Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007) ("effect must be given to all the words of the statute 
if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant."); State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 
108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006) (same). Therefore, there must be a way to interpret Ie. §§ 
12-117 and 12-120(3 ) together, or else the definition of "party" in Ie. § 12-120(3) is 
meaningl ess. 
In Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 226 P.3d 
1277,1282 (2010), reh'g denied (Mar. 17,2010), a case involving a breach of contract claim, the 
school district, as the prevailing party, requested attorney fees under both Ie. §§ 12-117 and 12-
121. Id. The Supreme Court, in ruling on the issue, stated "The School District also requests 
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121, which permits fee awards to prevailing parties in 'any civil 
action.' This request is denied because I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding 
attorney fees for the entities to which it applies." Id. (citing to and relying on Westway Canst., 
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Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho 107, 116, 73 P.3d 721, 730 (2003) and State v. Hagerman 
Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997». However, there is no 
discussion in Potlatch of the exclusivity of § 12-117 over § 12-120(3). As Judge Norton pointed 
out, no request was made for attorney fees in Potlatch under 12-120(3), so there was no 
opportunity to discuss exclusivity as to that statute.9 However, looking at Potlatch, it is clear that 
the Supreme Court was applying the principle of statutory interpretation which states that "a later 
or more specific statute controls over an earlier or more general statute." Beehler, 145 Idaho at 
658, 182 P.3d at 715. Both Ie. §§ 12-117 and 12-121 allow awards of attorney fees as general 
matters to the prevailing party. Both have a fairly similar standard for application of attorney 
fees. IO However, since Ie. § 12-117 is more specific than Ie. § 12-121 (§ 12-117 applies 
specifically to governmental entities, whereas § 12-121 applies to all cases), the "more specific" 
canon of construction would come into play. Because Ie. §§ 12-117 and 12-121 have an almost 
identical standard, it makes sense for the Court to rule that § 12-117, being the more specific, 
applies over § 12-121. The cases following Potlatch and applying the exclusivity rule bear out 
this analysis. See State, Dept. of Transp. v. HJ Grathol, 278 P.3d 957, 963 (Idaho 2012) (holding 
that I C. § 12-117 is exclusive over Ie. § 12-121, without discussion of other statutes); City of 
Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353, 357 (2012) (same); Arambarri v. Armstrong, 
152 Idaho 734, 274 P.3d 1249 (2012), reh'g denied (May 7,2012) (holding that Ie. § 12-117 is 
9 Unlike this case, which is clearly framed as a breach of employment contract case, in Potlatch it was 
claimed that the district "breached the Master Agreement." Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 
Idaho 630, 632, 226 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2010), reh'g denied (Mar. 17,2010). Such Master Agreements are statutory 
creations, and are generally formed without consideration. See I.e. § 33-1271. et seq .. Therefore, they conceivably 
fall outside of the "commercial transaction" requirements of I.e. § 12-120(3). 
10 Fees are only available under I. C . § 12-117 if the Court finds that "the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." I.e. § 12-117(1). Fees are only available under I.e. § 12-121 if the Court is left 
"with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation." See Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d, 580, 591 (2009). See also I.R.e.P. 54(e)(l). 
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exclusive over Ie. § 12-121, also analyzing that Ie. § 12-117 is exclusive of requests for fees 
under the private attorney general doctrine); Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 818-19, 
264 P.3d 916, 925-26 (2011) (holding that Ie. § 12-117 is exclusive over Ie. § 12-121, also 
analyzing fees under Ie. § 12-117 for judicial review of administrative proceedings); Lake CDA 
Investments, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 284-85, 233 P.3d 721,731-32 (2010) 
(only discussing Ie. § 12-117, and not discussing any other statute or principle). 
These cases show that Ie. § 12-117 is exclusive as to less specific statutes (§ 12-121) or 
principles (the private attorney general doctrine), but do not address more specific statutes, such 
as Ie. § 12-120(3). Because Ie. § 12-117 is the general statute, dealing with all governmental 
agencies and political subdivisions, Ie. § 12-120(3), which deals specifically with only 
commercial transactions (including employment contracts) would control under the 
circumstances of this case. In fact, there are numerous cases where IC. § 12-117 has been 
construed in harmony with other (more specific) fee award statutes. For example, in Beehler, 
though fees were requested under both Ie. §§ 12-117 and 6-918A (the fee award statute for 
claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act), the Court of Appeals determined that fees were 
properly awarded under 6-918A, as it was more specific. Beehler, 145 Idaho at 661, 182 P.3d at 
718. 11 In Clark v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 532, 5 P.3d 988,993 (2000), 
attorney fees were requested under both Ie. §§ 12-117 and 12-120, and the State was awarded 
attorney fees pursuant to Ie. § 12-120. Similarly, in Sadid, attorney fees were requested under 
numerous statutes, including Ie. §§ 12-117, 12-120(3), 12-121, 6-918A, and 42 Us.e. § 1988, 
11 But see Brown v. City of Pocatello, 14S Idaho S02, SI1-12, 229 P.3d 1164, 1173-74 (2010) (Fees were 
requested under both 1. C. § § 12-117 and 6-91SA, but the Court held that § 12-117 was exclusive, without discussion 
of Beehler). 
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but fees were eventually awarded to Idaho State University pursuant to Ie. § 12-120(3). Sadid, 
151 Idaho at 942, 265 P.3d at 1154. 12 
Because the language of I e. § § 12-120(3) and 12-117 can be harmonized so that they do 
not contradict, they can work together to allow for attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) when 
there is a commercial transaction involved. Thus, where no other more specific statute applies, 
I C. § 12-117 is the source of attorney fees when a suit is brought against a state agency or 
political subdivision. See Ie. § 12-117(1). However, when a claim related to a commercial 
transaction (such as a breach of employment contract claim) is brought against the state of Idaho, 
or a political subdivision thereof, the more specific Ie. § 12-120(3) comes into play, and 
becomes a source from which attorney fees should be awarded. Therefore, pursuant to the 
language of I e. § 12-120(3), an award of attorney fees to the Board was appropriate as all of the 
claims against it were breach of contract claims. Since there was no argument from Plaintiff that 
the fees were umeasonable, R. Vol. I, p. 139, the Board requests that this Court reverse the denial 
of attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3), and award the Board attorney fees in the amount of 
$51,483.50. 
B. THE TIMELINE OF DECISIONS DOES NOT SUPPORT THE IMPLICIT 
OVERRULING OF WILLIE AND OTHER CASES ALLOWING AN A WARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES TO GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES UNDERI.C. § 12-120(3). 
The difficulty with interpreting the statutes and cases applying Ie. §§ 12-117 and 12-
12 There are many examples of fees being awarded under I.e. § 12-120(3) where there are governmental 
entities involved. See also City o( McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 664-65, 201 P.3d 629, 637-38 (2009) 
(discussing that an award of fees to attorneys suing the City under I.e. § 12-120(3) could be determined when a 
prevailing party was determined); Noak v. Idaho Dept. o(Correction, 152 Idaho 305, 271 P.3d 703, 711-12 (2012), 
reh'g denied (Mar. 12, 2012) (allowing attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) to the Idaho Department of 
Corrections); Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 830, 831-33, 979 P.2d 1188, 1189-91 (1999) (discussion of attorney fees 
under I.e. §§ 12-117, 12-120(3), and 12-121, and awarding fees on appeal under 12-120(3»; Bott v. Idaho State 
Bldg. Auth.. 128 Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996) (affirming an award of attorney fees under § 12-120(3) 
against the Idaho State Building Authority). 
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120(3) is that in order to conclude that Ie. § 12-117 is the exclusive source of attorney fees in 
cases such as this, numerous cases must be implicitly overruled. For example, where Willie 
allows for attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) to the employer for a breach of employment 
contract case i3 , and Potlatch purportedly limits such awards of attorney fees without any 
discussion of Willie J4 , the only conclusion would be that Willie has implicitly been overruled. 
However, there are a number of concerns with this conclusion. First, Potlatch not only failed to 
state that it was specifically overruling Willie, but Willie has recently been upheld as good law by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. See Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 942, 265 P.3d 1144, 
1154 (2011 ) (citing to Willie as the source under which attorney fees could be awarded to the 
employer for a breach of employment contract claims). Therefore, Willie cannot have been 
implicitly overruled, or else it would not have been cited as good law in Sadid, a case that is very 
similar in nature to this one (i.e. an educational employer prevailed on a breach of employment 
contract claim brought by an employee). Second, Courts should not lightly deem "one of its 
decisions to have been implicitly overruled and thus stripped of its precedential authority." 
McNair Builders, Inc. v. Taylor,3 A.3d 1132, 1142 (D.C. 2010). Allowing implicit overrulings 
of the kind which allegedly occurred in this case would make it extremely difficult for parties to 
determine what is and is not the law. Without an express statement overruling a case it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a case is still good law utilizing available 
methods of cite checking (such as Westlaw's KeyCite or Shepard's Citations). For example, 
looking at Willie on Westlaw's KeyCite, there is no indication of any negative treatment of the 
13 Williev. Bd. o[Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59P.3d 302, 307 (2002). 
14 Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010), reh'g 
denied (Mar. 17,2010). 
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case. Therefore, a determination that Potlatch implicitly overruled Willie is not appropriate. 
A review of the time line of cases that bear on the analysis of the applicability of both Ie. 
§§ 12-117 and 12-120(3) show that there is no need for the Court to determine that Willie was 
implicitly overruled. Without an exhaustive review of applicable cases, confusion regarding 
exclusivity of I e. § 12-117 over § 12-120(3) could arise. However, a review of applicable cases 
shows, almost without exception, that the interpretation cited above (that Ie. § 12-117 IS 
exclusive as to any more general attorney fee statutes, such as Ie. § 12-121) is proper. 
1. Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 917 P.2d 403 (1996) abrogated by Rincover v. State, 
Dept. o(Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 473 (1999) (holding that the 
standard of review utilized in Roe was improper)IS. Roe appears to be the first case 
adopting language that Ie. § 12-117 is exclusive. 16 Roe, 128 Idaho at 572-73, 917 
P.2d at 406-07 (1996). However, Roe only held that attorney fees against a state 
agency are not available under the private attorney general doctrine, because Ie. § 
12-117 is intended to prevail over that statute. Id. The Court specifically stated that 
"we must first address whether there is a conflict between I.C. § 12-117 and the 
private attorney general doctrine, which draws its viability from I.C. § 12-121. If the 
question were simply a conflict between I.C. §§ 12-121 and 12-117, the latter would 
prevail." Id. at 128 Idaho 572,917 P.2d 406. It then held that 
Comparing the private attorney general doctrine with I.C. § 12-117, the 
private attorney general doctrine considers the value of the prevailing 
party's contribution, while I.C. § 12-117 considers the character of the 
losing party's case. This difference evidences a legislative intent to make 
the standard of I.C. § 12-117 the basis for an attorney fee award against a 
state agency, rather than the tests encompassed under the private attorney 
general doctrine. 
Id., 128 Idaho at 573, 917 P.2d at 407 (emphasis added). Thus, the only exclusivity of 
Ie. § 12-117 is over Ie. § 12-121. No other attorney fee statutes are discussed. 
Further, the language only dealt with awards of attorney fees against state agencies, 
not awards to state agencies. 
15 Rincover was later overruled in part. City o(Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353,355 (2012) 
(holding that the standard of review for attorney fee cases was an abuse of discretion). 
16 There are other cases discussing the 1994 revisions to 1. C. § 12-117 before Roe, but counsel could not find 
any that discuss exclusivity. 
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2. State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. (HWRO) , 130 Idaho 718, 947 P.2d 391 
(1997). In HWRO, an award of fees was given against the State pursuant to the 
private attorney general doctrine. Id., 130 Idaho at 721,947 P.2d at 394. The Supreme 
Court, relying on Roe, again stated that "a court may not award attorney fees against a 
state agency under the private attorney general doctrine." Id., 130 Idaho at 722, 947 
P.2d at 395. It also held that "I.e. § 12-117 provides the exclusive basis upon which 
to seek an award of attorney fees against a state agency." Id. (emphasis added). No 
other attorney fee statute was discussed. Again, this language only dealt with awards 
of attorney fees against state agencies, not to state agencies. 
3. Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 677-78, 978 P.2d 233,237-38 
(1999) overruled by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012) 
(with regard to the standard of review, only). Though no attorney fees were granted in 
Treasure Valley Concrete, fees were requested under multiple statutes, including Ie. 
§§ 12-117,12-120, and 12-121. Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that none 
of the statutes was applicable because none of the standards for awarding fees were 
met. Id. However, though there was an analysis of the applicability of each of the 
statutes discussed above, there was no discussion of exclusivity of any statute. 
Therefore it can be concluded that in 1999 there had been no determination that Ie. § 
12-117 was exclusive over 12-120(3). 
4. Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 830, 831-33,979 P.2d 1188, 1189-91 (1999). The fact 
pattern in Hummer is a bit convoluted. Hummer sued her employer, the Idaho 
Department of Education, related to her employment termination (including contract 
claims). Hummer prevailed in the district court, and requested attorney fees pursuant 
to Ie. § 12-117 and § 12-121, which was denied because the case was not defended 
unreasonably. Id. at 832, 1190. The Dept. of Ed. appealed. Following the appeal, 
Hummer requested attorney fees pursuant to Ie. § 12-120(3), which the district court 
denied. Hummer appealed the denial of attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3). The 
Supreme Court refused to overturn the district court's decision, concluding that the 
procedural process of the case did not allow attorney fees at that point. On appeal, 
both Hummer and Evans (the Superintendent of the Dept. of Ed.) requested attorney 
fees pursuant to Ie. § 12-120(3). Fees were granted to the Evans, because he 
prevailed on appeal. Thus, even though Ie. § 12-117 could have applied under the 
circumstances, the Court found that Ie. § 12-120(3) was a basis for attorney fees for 
the Superintendent of the Dept. of Ed. when prevailing on a contract claim on appeal. 
5. Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131,59 P.3d 302 (2002). In Willie, the School 
District obtained an award of attorney fees against the plaintiff under Ie. § 12-120(3) 
for successfully defending against breach of contract claims. Id., 138 Idaho at 136, 59 
P.3d at 307. There is no discussion of Ie. § 12-117. This decision seems to contradict 
the exclusivity language in Hagerman and Roe. However, it does not. It was a state 
agency which was pursuing attorney fees, and therefore no fees were being sought 
against a state agency (which is all that Hagerman and Roe addressed). 
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6. Clark v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 532, 5 P.3d 988, 993 
(2000). The State prevailed on a breach of employment contract claims in Clark, and 
requested attorney fees pursuant to Ie. § 12-120. This requested was granted with the 
Supreme Court relying on Atwood v. Western Construction. Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 923 
P.2d 479 (Ct.App.1996). Clark, 134 Idaho at 532, 5 P.3d at 993. Though Ie. § 12-
117 is mentioned and discussed, there is no discussion of exclusivity of one statute 
over the other. This analysis agrees with Willie, in that the there were no attorney fees 
being awarded against a state subdivision or agency. 
7. Westwav Const .. Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 139 Idaho 107,73 P.3d 721 (2003).17 In 
this case, Westway Construction requested attorney fees against the Idaho 
Transportation department. The Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Westway requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3), which provides: "In any civil action to recover ... in 
any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the 
prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by 
the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." That statute is not applicable. 
"LC. § 12-117 provides the exclusive basis upon which to seek an award 
of attorney fees against a state agency." State v. Hagerman Water Right 
Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391,396 (1997). Westway has 
not requested attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, and therefore we 
need not address whether the requirements of that statute have been met. 
Id., 139 Idaho at 116, 73 P.3d at 730 (2003). This language corresponds exactly with 
Hagerman and Roe, and meshes perfectly with Willie and Clark, in that a private 
entity may not obtain attorney fees against a governmental entity under any statute 
other than Ie. § 12-117. Therefore, Westway could not have obtained attorney fees 
against the LT.D. under Ie. § 12-120(3), because the LT.D. is a state agency. 18 
8. Cox v. City of Sandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, 133, 90 P.3d 352, 358 (Ct. App. 2003).19 In 
Cox, both parties requested attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) (the claims were 
breach of contract claims for failure to pay rents). However, since no one prevailed on 
appeal, the Court declined to award fees on appeal. There was no discussion of 
exclusivity of Ie. § 12-117, nor was that statute mentioned at all. 
Westway was decided in May, 2003. 
18 The next case chronologically is awarding Eaeret v. Bonner County. 139 Idaho 780, 86 P.3d 494 (2004) 
overruled by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012) (on the standard of review for attorney 
fees for attorney fee awards). While there is dicta that attorney fees were awarded exclusively under 1. C. § 12-117 
against the county (which matches the analysis of Roe, Hagerman, and Westway), most of the discussion deals with 
whether the motion for fees and costs was timely. Therefore this case is not particularly applicable to this analysis. 
19 Cox was decided in November, 2003. 






9. Huvett v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 911, 104 P.3d 946, 953 (2004). In Huyett, 
Idaho State University was awarded attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) for 
prevailing on a breach of employment contract claim. 
10. Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312-13,109 P.3d 161,166-67 
(2005). In Hayden Lake, the claim was for violation of a worker's compensation 
statute. The State Insurance Fund appealed, arguing that it was entitled to attorney 
fees under Ie. § 12-120(3). The Supreme Court discussed whether the exclusive 
source of attorney fees related to such claim was Ie. § 41-1839(4), but determined 
that it was not exclusive. Ultimately, the Court determined that because it was a 
statutory claim, it was not a breach of contract, and Ie. § 12-120(3) did not apply. Id. 
No attorney fees were awarded, and Ie. § 12-117 was not discussed. 
11. Jenkins v. Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202, 207-08, 177 P.3d 949, 954-55 (2008).20 In 
Jenkins, Barsalou was the sheriff of Lemhi County, who was sued related to the 
judicial sale of various properties. Barsalou requested attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to both Ie. §§ 12-117 and 12-121. Id. The Supreme Court awarded attorney 
fees, holding that the Appellant's arguments had no basis in fact or law. Id. However, 
there is no discussion of whether attorney fees were awarded under § 12-117 or § 12-
121, nor is there any discussion of exclusivity. Presumably, since the standards for 
award of fees are almost identical under either statute, the Court did not feel it 
necessary to specify which applied or discuss exclusivity. 
12. Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 658, 182 P.3d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 2008).21 
In Beehler, the complaint was for negligence against the County. Though a tort claim 
was filed, the claim was dismissed because the Appellant failed to also file an 
undertaking as required by Ie. § 6-610. The Respondent County and Sheriff 
requested attorney fees under Ie. §§ 6-918A and 12-117. The Court held that 
because this was a tort claim case, Ie. § 6-918A was exclusive, and Ie. § 12-117 did 
not apply. Though it does not so state, this analysis comports with the canon of 
statutory interpretation that the more specific statute prevails. 
13. Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (2008).22 In 
Cantwell, the claim was for wrongful termination. Though the Appellant (an 
individual) requested attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3i3 and the City requested 
fees under Ie. § 12-11 7, no fees were awarded (the appellant did not get attorney 
fees because they were not the prevailing party, and the City did not get attorney fees 
under Ie. § 12-117 because the appeal was not frivolous). Id. Further, there was no 
Jenkins was actually decided in November, 2007, but a petition for rehearing was denied February 12, 
Beehler was decided April, 2008. 
Cantwell was decided July, 2008. 
Cantwell, 146 Idaho at 138, 191 P.3d at 216 (fn. 6). 
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discussion of exclusivity of I C § 12-117 over § 12-120(3). 
14. City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 667, 201 P.3d 629, 640 (2009). In Buxton, 
the City sued Buxton for legal malpractice. Because the case was remanded, no award 
of attorney fees was made. Id. However, the Court mentioned that Buxton requested 
attorney fees pursuant to IC § 12-120(3), and there was no discussion of the 
inapplicability of that statute or of the exclusivity of any other statute. 
15. Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 226 P.3d 
1277, 1282 (2010), reh'g denied (Mar. 17, 2010).24 In this case, the Respondent 
School District prevailed on a breach of contract case against an education association 
related to the alleged violation of a master contract, and requested attorney fees 
pursuant to both I C § § 12-117 and 12-121. Relying on Westway and Hagerman, the 
Supreme Court held that "I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney 
fees for the entities to which it applies." While this language is similar to what is 
stated in Westway, Hagerman, and Roe, it is modified slightly, making the 
implications broader. Westway, Hagerman, and Roe only held that IC § 12-117 is 
the exclusive statute under which attorney fees may be awarded "against a state 
agency". Potlatch, without any explanation as to a basis for such holding, held that 
the statue is exclusive "for the entities to which it applies". While this language could 
be construed harmoniously with Westway, Hagerman, and Roe, it could also be 
construed more broadly. For example, it could be construed to limit attorney fees 
being sought by governmental entities. However, such interpretation would be 
incorrect. 
As discussed above, there is no discussion of exclusivity over IC § 12-120(3). In 
fact, there is no discussion of IC § 12-120(3), nor of Willie, Clark, Huyett, nor of 
any other case in which attorney fees are granted to a governmental agency under I C 
§ 12-120(3) for a breach of contract case. Therefore, a more logical reading of 
Potlatch would be that the exclusivity discussed would be limited to the exclusivity 
discussed in Hagerman and Westway, which, as discussed above, was limited to I C 
§ 12-117 over § 12-121. In this way, Potlatch can be read in harmony with Willie, 
Clark, Huyett, Hagerman, Westway, and all cases coming before it without implicitly 
overruling anything. 
16. Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 811-12, 229 P.3d 1164, 1173-74 (2010).25 
Brown is the first case that begins to rely on the broader language of Potlatch to 
discuss the exclusivity of I C § 12-117. In this case, a request was made by the City 
for attorney fees under both I C § § 12-117 and 6-918A. Id. The Supreme Court held 
that § 12-117 is exclusive (relying on Potlatch, and citing to no other case), even 
Potlatch was originally decided February, 2010, with a rehearing denied March, 2010. 
Brown was decided April, 2010. 
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though it is a tort claim case. Id. There is no discussion of Beehler (which has a 
directly contradictory ruling), nor is there any discussion of Ie. § 12-120(3 )?6 
17. Lake CDA Investments, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 284-85, 233 
P.3d 721,731-32 (2010)?7 In Lake CDA, the exclusivity of Ie. § 12-117 is again 
mentioned, citing to Hagerman. However, the issue in that case is that fees were 
awarded against a governmental entity (the Land Board and the Transportation 
Department). Therefore, this is in compliance with the language of Hagerman. 
However, the case is not a breach of contract case, and Ie. § 12-120(3) is neither 
mentioned nor discussed. 
18. Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 392, 247 P.3d 615, 619 (2010)?8 
The issue in Smith is not particularly relevant to this analysis, as that case deals with 
whether or not a court can award attorney fees for an appeal from an administrative 
proceeding. The Court concludes that such award is not appropriate under Ie. § 12-
117. Smith, 150 Idaho at 391, 247 P.3d at 618. 
Unfortunately, Smith contains some dicta which is directly relevant to this appeal. 
The appellant (an individual) also requested fees pursuant to Ie. § 12-120(3) and 12-
121. Id. at 392, 619. Though these requests were specifically withdrawn and waived 
during oral argument, the Supreme Court stated: "Even if he had not, I.C. § 12-117 
'is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the entities to which it 
applies.'" Id. (citing to Potlatch and Hagerman). While this language is the closest 
that the Supreme Court has ever come to stating that Ie. § 12-117 is exclusive over 
Ie. § 12-120(3) in all situations, further statements show that result was not the 
intention if the Court: "As noted above, I.C. § 12-117 specifically provides for 
attorney fees in actions against the counties, so it governs this case exclusively. See 
I.e. § 12-117(4)(b). Smith therefore cannot receive attorney fees under I.e. §§ 12-
120(3) or 12-121." Id. Because this was the appellant, a private individual, requesting 
fees against a County, the only available statute was Ie. § 12-117. This was not a 
situation like Willie, Clark, or this case, where a state agency or subdivision is 
seeking attorney fees against a private individual (and where attorney fees were 
allowed pursuant to Ie. § 12-120(3)). 
This case is pivotal, because it is one that Judge Norton relied on in denying attorney 
fees to the Board. R. Vol. I, pp. 140 - 41. Where Judge Norton concluded that Smith 
held that the Board could not get attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3), Judge Norton 
was incorrect. Smith, relying on Potlatch and Hagerman, holds nothing more than 
26 Admittedly, the City did not discuss or cite to Beehler when it requested attorney fees on appeal under I.e. 
§ 6-918A, so the Court would have no reason to discuss the case as a source of fees or contradictory authority. 
Respondent's Brief, Brown v. City o[Pocatello, 2009 WL 1934528 (Idaho), at*21. 
27 Lake CDA was decided June, 2010. 
28 Smith was decided December, 2010. 





that a private individual cannot get attorney fees from a governmental agency or 
subdivision under any statute but Ie § 12-117. None of these cases prohibit a 
governmental agency or subdivision from obtaining attorney fees pursuant to Ie § 
12-120(3). In coming to the conclusion that the Board was limited to only Ie § 12-
117, Judge Norton mistook the law. 
19. Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County o{Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 415, 258 P.3d 340, 350 
(2011)?9 In Allied Bail Bonds, there was no discussion of exclusivity, even though 
attorney fees were requested by the Sheriff and County Board of Commissioners 
requested attorney fees under Ie §§ 9-344, 12-117, 12-120(3), and 12-121. The 
Court granted fees under Ie § 12-117 since the appeal was frivolous. There was no 
discussion of exclusivity of any statute over another. 
20. Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 818-19, 264 P.3d 916, 925-26 (2011).30 
Sopatyk holds that Ie § 12-117 is exclusive as to a request for fees under Ie § 12-
121, when requested by the individual against the County. No attorney fees were 
awarded to the County on Appeal because this was a judicial appeal of an 
administrative proceeding, and therefore Ie § 12-117 did not apply (as held in 
Smith). There was no mention of Ie § 12-120(3), and the case was not a commercial 
transaction case. 
21. Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 942-43, 265 P.3d 1144, 1154-55 (2011).31 
As discussed above, Sadid involved an award of attorney to Idaho State University 
under Ie § 12-120(3) (and relying on Willie) for prevailing on a breach of contract 
claim. There was no discussion of Potlatch or exclusivity, even though fees were 
requested under Ie § 12-117. This result logically follows Clark, Willie, and Huyett, 
in that it was not an individual who was seeking attorney fees, but instead was I.S.U. 
22. Henry v. Taylor, 152 Idaho 155,267 P.3d 1270, 1276-78 (2012).32 Henry involved a 
claim related to the Public Records Act against the Canyon County Prosecuting 
Attorney and Canyon County. When attorney fees were requested pursuant to Ie §§ 
9-344(2), 12-117 and 12-121, the Supreme Court said that neither § 12-117 nor § 12-
121 applied, because § 9-344(2) was exclusive for "proceedings to enforce 
compliance with the [Public Records] Act." Id. Thus, though a County was sued, Ie 
§ 12-117 was not held to be exclusive. This result complies with the canon of 
statutory construction that a more specific statute prevails over a more general statute, 
and supports the conclusion that Ie § 12-117 is not purely exclusive as to every 
other attorney fee award statute. 
Allied Bail Bonds was decided in July, 2011. 
Sopatyk was decided November 9,2011. 
Sadidwas decided November 30, 2011. 
Henry was decided January 5, 2012. 





23. Chavez v. Canyon County. State. ex rei. its Duly Elected Bd. of County Com'rs, 152 
Idaho 297, 271 P.3d 695, 702-03 (2012).33 Chavez involved a tax dispute between a 
landowner and Canyon County. Attorney fees were requested on appeal by the 
individual pursuant to both Ie. §§ 12-121 and 12-117. Though the Court analyzed 
both standards for fee awards under those sections, no fees were awarded because the 
appellants were pro se. Id. There was no discussion of exclusivity of 1 e. § 12-117. 
24. Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County, 152 Idaho 207, 268 P.3d 1159, 1165 (2012)?4 
The claim in Kepler-Fleenor dealt with the dedication of property as a public road. 
The County requested fees pursuant to both Ie. §§ 12-117 and 12-121. Relying on 
Potlatch, fees were denied to the County under Ie. § 12-121 because § 12-117 was 
held to be exclusive. This analysis complies with Potlatch, Hagerman, Westway, and 
Roe, in that all of those cases held that Ie. § 12-117 was exclusive as to Ie. § 12-
121. This also complies with the canon of statutory construction that the more 
specific statute (l e. § 12-117, which deals specifically with governmental entities) 
prevails over the more general statute (l e. § 12-121, which deals with all cases). This 
ruling, however, does not mean that a governmental entity cannot request fees under 
Ie. § 12-120(3). There was no commercial transaction involved in the case, and so 
there was consequently no discussion of Ie. § 12-120(3). Judge Norton's reliance on 
this case as a basis for denying attorney fees to the Board was misplaced. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 140 41. 
25. Noak v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 152 Idaho 305, 271 P.3d 703, 711-12 (2012), 
reh'g denied (Mar. 12, 2012).35 Noak involved a breach of contract claim (breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) against the Idaho Department of 
Correction, upon which the LD.O.C. prevailed. I.D.O.C. requested fees under 1 e. § 
12-120(3), which were granted. Id. There was no discussion of 1 e. § 12-117 or 
exclusivity. Further, the Court ruled that Ie. § 12-120(3) applied by relying on 
Huyett. This ruling comports with Sadid, Clark, Huyett, Willie, and all the other cases 
where a governmental agency was allowed attorney fees for prevailing on a breach of 
contract claim. The fact that it was decided the same month as Kepler-Fleenor shows 
that there has never been any intent to limit a state agency or governmental 
subdivision's ability to seek attorney fees pursuant to Ie. § 12-120(3) for breach of 
contract claims. 
26. City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353, 357 (2012)?6 City of Osburn 
was an appeal related to a denial of attorney fees under Ie. § 12-117. The City sued 
Randel to remove sheds from a property, and when the City moved to dismiss the 
case, Randel moved for attorney fees pursuant to Ie. §§ 12-117, 12-120, and 12-121, 
Though Chavez has a later reporter number than Kepler-Fleenor, it was decided earlier, on January 6, 2012. 
Kepler-Fleenor was decided January 24, 2012. 
Noak was decided January 6,2012, with a petition for rehearing denied March 12,2012. 
Though City of Osburn has a later reporter number than Arambarri, it was decided April 26, 2012. 
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which request was denied by the district court. The district court ruled that the case 
was not frivolous, and so denied the request for fees under Ie. § 12-117 (which was 
the only issue that was appealed). The Supreme Court ruled that Randel's argument 
that they were entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine was 
not valid, relying on Potlatch. See Id. (fn. 1). This ruling comports with both 
Hagernman and Roe which addressed the same issue many years before. 
The Court then went on to clarify the exclusivity issue. On appeal, both the City and 
Randel requested fees pursuant to Ie. § 12-117, which was denied to Randel because 
he did not prevail and to the City because the appeal was not frivolous. However, 
Randel also requested attorney fees under Ie. § 12-121. The Court stated: 
"Furthermore, 'I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for 
the entities to which it applies.' Potlatch Educ. Ass'n, 148 Idaho at 635, 226 P.3d at 
1282. Thus, even if the Randels prevailed, they would not be entitled to fees under 
I.e. § 12-121." City of Osburn, 277 P.3d at 357. This language shows the emphasis 
that it is when an individual seeks attorney fees against a governmental entity, they 
are limited to Ie. § 12-117 as opposed to Ie. § 12-121. 
27. Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734,274 P.3d 1249 (2012), reh'g denied (May 7, 
2012)?7 Arambarri brought a claim against Richard Armstrong, the director of the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare for reinstatement of an employment 
position, backpay and other benefits. Arambarri lost, appealed, and the appeal was 
denied. The Supreme Court denied Arambarri fees under Ie. § 12-117 because he 
was not the prevailing party and under the private attorney general doctrine because 
such has no longer been a basis for an award of fees since Roe. Arambarri, 274 P.3d 
at 1255. Armstrong requested fees under Ie. § 12-117 (which was denied because the 
case was a matter of first impression) and § 12-121 (which was denied because Ie. § 
12-117 is exclusive of § 12-121 under Potlatch). There is no discussion of Ie. § 12-
120(3), because the claims in this case were statutory (i.e. whether the terminations 
were done contrary to statutory requirements). Again, this case holds only that Ie. § 
12-117 is exclusive as to § 12-121, and does not address any other statute (as there 
did not appear to be a breach of contract claim). 
28. State, Dept. of Transp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87, 278 P.3d 957,963 (2012).38 HJ 
Grathol is a case for condemnation of private property. The Board requested attorney 
fees on appeal pursuant to Ie. § 12-121, which was denied because Ie. § 12-117 was 
held to be exclusive. Id., 278 P.3d at 963. Again, there was no commercial 
transaction, and so Ie. § 12-120(3) did not apply. Like in Arambarri, the only 
exclusivity which was establish was that Ie. § 12-117 applied over § 12-121. 
Arambarri was decided March 8, 2012, with a petition for rehearing denied May 7, 2012. 
HJ Grathol was decided June 1,2012. 
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This timeline39 shows that a few rules exist as to exclusivity. Whenever a governmental 
entity requests attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) after prevailing on a breach of contract claim, 
such fees are awarded. See Willie, Clark, Huyett, Sadid, and Noak, supra. When attorney fees are 
requested in a case involving a governmental entity and there is no commercial transaction, Ie. 
§ 12-117 seems to be the controlling statute. See Roe, Hagerman, Westway, Potlatch, Lake CDA, 
Smith, City of Osburn, Arambarri, supra. These cases also generally show that where there is a 
request for fees under both Ie. § § 12-117 and 12-121 and a governmental subdivision or state 
agency is involved, regardless of whether the request comes from an individual or a 
governmental subdivision/state agency, Ie. § 12-117 is held to be exclusive. See Potlatch, 
Kepler-Fleenor, Arambarri, HJ Grathol, supra. Further, when there is a more specific fee 
statute, it prevails over a more general statute. See Beehle/o (I e. § 6-918A is exclusive as to 
Ie. § 12-117 for Tort Claims Act cases), Henry (Ie. § 9-344(2) is exclusive as to Ie. § 12-117 
for Public Records Act cases), supra. Though there may be some confusion as to the applicable 
rule, one issue is clear. There is no case holding that Ie. § 12-117 is exclusive over Ie. § 12-
120(3) when a governmental entity prevails on a contract claim, as is the case in this appeal. 
The closest case to making such a ruling is Potlatch, where the Potlatch School District 
prevailed on a breach of contract claim, but was not awarded attorney fees. Attorney fees were 
not sought in Potlatch under Ie. § 12-120(3) as the gist of the Complaint was not a commercial 
39 There are other cases that falls in the time line, but will not be discussed here. See Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. City 
orCaldwell, 37242, 2012 WL 1449597 (Idaho Apr. 27, 2012) (unpublished at the time of this brief). Batt v. Idaho 
State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996) ("Bott II") is also on the timeline, and discusses the 
applicability of both I.e. §§ 12-117 and 12-120(3). However, because the Supreme Court had already determined 
that 1. e. § 12-117 was inapplicable (there was no governmental subdivision involved), see Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. 
Auth., 122 Idaho 471,480,835 P.2d 1282, 1291 (1992) ("Bott I"), it is factually distinct from this case and is not 
helpful to the analysis. 
40 Beehler appears to be overruled by Brown, which held that 1. e. § 12-117 is exclusive as to I. e. § 6-918A, 
but it does not specifically state so. 
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transaction, i.e. no employment contract existed between the school district and the Education 
Association, as required by Ie. § 12-120(3). As numerous cases make crystal clear, the Supreme 
Court does not award attorney fees under a given statute when the petitioner has not asked under 
that statute. See, e.g., Clark v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 532, 5 P.3d 988, 
993 (2000) (holding that attorney fees were awarded to the State only because some authority 
was provided); Capps v. FIA Card Services, NA., 149 Idaho 737, 744, 240 P.3d 583,590 (2010) 
("We have repeatedly held that we will not consider a request for attorney fees on appeal that is 
not supported by legal authority or argument."); Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369, 79 
P.3d 723, 728 (2003) (same); Westway Canst., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 139 Idaho 107, 116, 
73 P.3d 721, 730 (2003) (when a party did not request attorney fees under the applicable statute, 
the Supreme Court did not address that statute). See also IA.R. 41(b) (party must argue the legal 
right to attorney fees; merely citing IA.R. 41 is insufficient as a basis for attorney fees). Because 
the Potlatch School District elected to forego fees under Ie. § 12-120(3), the Supreme Court had 
no reason to address such statute. Therefore, Potlatch cannot be read as a blanket ban on the 
award of attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) due to the exclusivity of Ie. § 12-117. 
In relying on Smith, Kepler-Fleenor, and Potlatch, supra, as a basis for denying attorney 
fees, Judge Norton incorrectly concluded that Ie. § 12-117 is the exclusive source of attorney 
fees in breach of contract cases if there is a governmental entity involved. There are at least five 
cases that hold that awards under Ie. § 12-120(3) are allowed to governmental entities, 
including some that were decided after Smith and Potlatch. See Noak, supra. Therefore, Judge 
Norton was incorrect in concluding that the Board is not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Ie. § 12-120(3), and her decision should be reversed as an abuse of discretion. 
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C. BECAUSE THE BOARD IS NOT A STATE AGENCY OR POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION AS DEFINED BY I.e. § 12-117, AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES IS APPROPRIATE UNDER I.e. § 12-120(3) . 
Even if I e. § 12-117 is the exclusive source of attorney fees to those entities to which it 
applies, it does not apply to the Board. Ie. § 12-117(1) only applies to "state agencies" or 
"political subdivisions". A state agency is defined under Ie. § 67-5201(2)41 as "each state board, 
commission, department or officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested 
cases" (emphasis added). The Board is not a state board, as it is a board of trustees of a local 
school district. The Board is also not a "political subdivision", which is defined as "a city, a 
county, any taxing district or a health district." Though Judge Norton accurately pointed out that 
Mountain Home School District is a "taxing district" as defined by statute, R. Vol. I, p. 141, 
Mountain Home School District is not a party to this action. R. Vol. I, p. 4. 
When preparing the Complaint, Sanders chose to name as parties the "Board of Trustees 
of the Mountain Home School District No. 193", and not the Mountain Home School District 
itself. R. Vol. I, p. 4. This was her choice, as the law clearly states that School Districts "may sue 
and be sued". Ie. § 33-301. However, it is the school district itself which is the "body corporate 
and politic", Ie. § 33-301, and which is included in the definition of taxing district under Ie. § 
63-3101, not the Board of Trustees of the school district. Boards of Trustees and School Districts 
are governed by separate chapters under Title 33, Idaho Code (chapters 5 and 3 respectively). 
The Board is the governing body of the Mountain Home School District, but is not the same 
thing as the district itself. Ie. § 33-501. 
Because Sanders chose to sue the Board instead of the Mountain Home School District 
41 I.C § 12-117(5)(d) defines "state agency" to mean "any agency as defined by section 67-5201, Idaho 
Code." 
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itself, there is no state agency or political subdivision involved in the lawsuit, and LC.§ 12-117 
does not apply. See Batt v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 480, 835 P.2d 1282, 1291 
(1992). On the other hand, the Board does qualify as a "party" under Ie. § 12-120(3), which 
defines party as "any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state 
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof." By suing the Board, Sanders is suing the persons who 
are the governing body of the District, and therefore, is subject to the application of Ie. § 12-
120(3). 
This interpretation comports with prior case decisions. In Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 138 
Idaho 131, 59 P .3d 302 (2002), the plaintiff sued the Board of trustees of Oneida School District 
No. 351, as well as the superintendent, but did not sue the district itself. In Potlatch Educ. Ass In 
v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010), reh'g denied (Mar. 17, 
2010), the School District itself was a party, meaning that Ie. § 12-117 applied to the case. 
Since Ie. § 12-117 does not apply to the Board, no argument can be made that Ie. § 12-
117 applies in this case. The Board requests that this Court reverse the determination of the 
honorable Court below that Ie. § 12-117 is exclusive, and allow an award of attorney fees under 
I C. § 12-120(3). The decision is an abuse of discretion, as it does not comport with applicable 
law. Since there has been no objection as to the reasonableness of the fees requested, the Board 
requests that it be awarded fees in the amount of$51,483.50. R. Vol. I, p. 135. 
D. THE BOARD REQUESTS ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
The Board requests attorney fees and costs on appeal as allowed by IA. R. 40 and 41. 
Should the Board prevail on this appeal, it is entitled to costs as a matter of right as the prevailing 
party. IA.R. 40(a). With regard to attorney fees, as discussed above, should the Board prevail, it 
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is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I. e. §§ 12-120(3) andlor 12-117. With regard to I. e. § 12-
120(3), all of Plaintiffs claims pursued to trial were claims for breaches of her employment 
contract. See R. Vol. 1, pp. 9 - 11. Case law is clear that claims for breach of employment 
contract fall under the definition of "commercial transaction" in I.e. § 12-120(3). Sadid v. Idaho 
State Univ.! 151 Idaho 932, 942, 265 P.3d 1144, 1154 (2011); Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 138 
Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002). Therefore, should the Board prevail, it would be 
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee under I.e. § 12-120(3). 
Further, should the Board prevail on appeal, fees should be awarded pursuant to I. e. § 
12-117. There was no reasonable conclusion or basis for Sanders to argue that I. e. § 12-117 is 
exclusive over 1. e. § 12-120(3) when it is the Board requesting attorney fees and not a private 
individual. Further, where Sanders chose to sue the Board instead of the school district, she had 
no basis for arguing that 1. e. § 12-117 was exclusive, particularly as I. e. § 12-117 does not apply 
to the Board. Therefore, Sanders's argument was without foundation, and fees should be 
awarded under this statute. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Board respectfully requests that Judge Norton's decision that attorney fees are not 
available under I. e. § 12-120(3) be overturned. There is no case stating that I. e. § 12-117 is 
exclusive when a governmental subdivision/state agency prevails on a breach of contract claim. 
Further, there is substantial basis for an award of attorney fees to a governmental subdivision/ 
state agency when it prevails on a breach of contract case. The exclusivity of I. e. § 12-117 is 
limited to specific situations, none of which apply in this case. For Judge Norton to conclude 
otherwise is a breach of her discretion. Therefore, such decision should be overturned and the 




Board should be awarded attorney fees for prevailing at trial in the amount of $51,483.50. 
~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jif:... day of August, 2012. 
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